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Although these factors may result in inefficiencies-like deviations from the law of one price due to pricing to market-they also shield price and wage dynamics from currency volatility, thus helping central banks maintain a low and stable headline infl ation. On the other hand, stable import prices and low exchange rate pass-through can also stem from nominal frictions impeding desired markup adjustment, thus interfering with equilibrium movements in relative prices. When local currency price stability of imports is due to price stickiness, it creates policy trade-offs between competing objectives; for example, between stabilizing the prices of domestically produced goods as opposed to the (relative) price of imported goods, which raise the importance of international considerations in the conduct of monetary policy.
In this chapter we reconsider these policy trade-offs in economies where stable import prices in local currency result from both nominal rigidities and endogenous destination-specifi c markup adjustment. We specify a twocountry model where each economy produces an array of country-specifi c, differentiated traded goods. In each country, we model local downstream fi rms as using one intermediate traded good, and possibly local inputs, to produce nontradable fi nal goods. In other words, each intermediate good is produced by an upstream monopolist and sold to a continuum of monopolistic downstream fi rms, active in each country, from which local consumers can directly buy further differentiated fi nal varieties. Thus, because both upstream and downstream fi rms have monopoly power, fi nal prices refl ect double marginalization. We posit that markets are segmentated across national borders, so that intermediate producers price-discriminate between domestic and foreign local downstream producers as a group, although not among individual local producers (charging different prices within the same country).
As in standard monetary models, we assume that fi rms set prices in local currency, adjusting them infrequently according to the Calvo mechanism. 2 Different from the previous literature, however, we explicitly model strategic interactions among upstream and downstream fi rms: upstream fi rms exercise their monopoly power by taking into account country-specifi c differences in the properties of the demand for their products. Relative to the literature already modeling vertical interactions between exporters and local fi rms (e.g., Bacchetta and Van Wincoop 2005; Corsetti and Dedola 2005; Devereux and Engel 2007; Monacelli 2005) , an important novel contribution of this chapter consists of analyzing the effects of staggered price setting at the downstream level on the optimal price (and markup) chosen by upstream producers.
Specifi cally, our analysis establishes three key characteristics of the perceived demand elasticity by upstream producers when nominal rigidities constrain price decisions by downstream fi rms. First, this elasticity is a 2. See the literature review in section 6.2.
Optimal Monetary Policy and Sources of Local-Currency Price Stability 321 decreasing function of the rate of change of fi nal prices in each industry: the higher this rate (thus the higher the price dispersion among fi nal producers selling an industry product), the higher the intermediate producer's equilibrium markup. Second, the perceived demand elasticity is marketspecifi c, depending on differences in industry-specifi c infl ation rates across the domestic and the export market. Sticky prices at consumer level create an incentive for upstream fi rms to price discriminate across borders, which leads to equilibrium deviations from the law of one price, independently of the degree of nominal rigidities in the upstream fi rms' own prices. Third, if either local inputs in downstream production are a good substitute of intermediate imported goods, or their share in the downstream fi rms' costs is low, the demand elasticity is decreasing in the price charged by upstream producers. In other words, downstream nominal rigidities magnify the price response to shocks by upstream monopolists who optimally reset their price in any given period. This generates strategic substitutability among upstream producers: a rise in marginal costs will lead to an increase in their desired markups.
These results have at least two notable implications for policy modeling and design. First, by shedding light on the link between optimal price adjustment at the dock and domestic infl ation rates, our results suggest a specifi c reason why, in line with the observations by Taylor (2000) , lower consumer price index (CPI) infl ation volatility and price dispersion may result in a lower degree of exchange rate pass-through: stable infl ation reduces at the margin the producers' incentives to price discriminate across countries, decreasing the sensitivity of their "desired markup" to cost changes.
Second, by showing that downstream price rigidities result into strategic substitutability among upstream producers, our results emphasize that adding several layers of nominal rigidities do not necessarily result in more price inertia. Strategic interactions among vertically integrated fi rms with sticky prices may create incentive for large price adjustment, feeding back into infl ation volatility.
In addition, our model specifi cation implies an important dimension of heterogeneity across fi rms that has a bearing on optimal monetary policy. In contrast to standard models, the marginal costs of our downstream fi rms are generally not symmetric, not even when the economy is completely closed to foreign trade and there are no markup shocks. Thus, monetary authorities are not able to achieve complete stabilization of fi nal prices. 3 The mechanism underlying these results is different from that emphasized by the previous literature focusing on vertical interactions between upstream and downstream fi rms, but that stresses real determinants of the local cur-3. In standard models with cost-push and markup shocks, monetary authorities can achieve complete price stability, but face trade-offs that motivate deviations from it-see, for instance, the discussion in Woodford (2003) . In our model, instead, stability of all prices is unfeasible to start with. rency price stability of imports. In previous work of ours, we assume that local fi rms produce consumer goods by combining intermediate tradable goods with local inputs (Corsetti and Dedola 2005; Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc 2008b) . In this framework, provided that the tradable goods and the local inputs are poor substitutes in production, the presence of local inputs tends to mute the response of upstream prices to shocks (corresponding to a case of strategic complementarity), and makes the exchange rate passthrough incomplete, even in the absence of nominal rigidities. Building an example of an economy encompassing both channels, we analyze conditions under which the properties of the demand elasticity faced by upstream producers are dominated by the effect of local inputs in production, as opposed to the effect of downstream nominal rigidities.
We characterize the optimal cooperative monetary policy under commitment. In order to reduce inefficiencies due to price stickiness, monetary policy does mitigate fl uctuations in the major components of consumer price infl ation. However, it falls short of stabilizing completely either the CPI, or the price of domestic intermediate goods. 4 Optimal monetary policies address different trade-offs, specifi c to both the international and the domestic dimensions of the economy. First, as in Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) , nominal rigidities in local currency at the upstream level lead benevolent monetary authorities to attach a positive weight to stabilizing the consumer price of imports, and thus deviate from perfect stabilization of the fi nal prices of domestic goods. Second, downstream technology shocks prevent perfect stabilization of all consumer prices, because vertical interactions with upstream fi rms, which may or may not adjust their prices, induce heterogeneity of marginal costs at retail level. This effect is compounded in an open economy setting, because of the response of the intermediate price of imports to exchange rate fl uctuations. Third, the elasticity of the producer's demand curve falls with the industry's dispersion of fi nal goods prices, motivating policy emphasis on fi nal price stabilization.
None of these trade-offs, however, entail specifi c prescriptions regarding the volatility of the real exchange rate. In the literature, optimal monetary policy in models with nominal rigidities in local currency is sometimes associated with a limited degree of real exchange rate volatility, relative to the terms of trade (see, e.g., Devereux and Engel 2007) . In contrast, we fi nd that implementing the optimal policy in our economy with nominal rigidities leads the real exchange rate to be more volatile, and the terms of trade to be less volatile, than in the same economy under fl exible prices. This is because of the combined effects of nominal rigidities, and the presence of nontradable components in fi nal goods. We take these fi ndings as a caution against strong policy prescriptions on the need to curb the volatility of the real exchange rate. The point is that, while there are good reasons to expect optimal policies to contain the volatility of the terms of trade, these reasons cannot be mechanically extended to the real exchange rate, whose volatility is bound to depend on a number of structural features of the economy.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we will briefl y survey the literature on pricing to market and monetary policy, with the goal of clarifying our contributions to it. Section 6.3 specifi es the model, while section 6.4 provides analytical results on the link between price stickiness and price discrimination arising from vertical interactions. Section 6.5 describes our calibration of the model. Section 6.6 presents the equilibrium dynamics of prices in response to shocks, while section 6.7 discusses the allocation under the optimal policy, relative to alternative policy rules and the case of fl exible prices. Section 6.8 concludes. An appendix provides analytical details on the model and the derivation of the main results.
Local Currency Price Stability and Efficient Monetary Stabilization
In this section we briefl y reconstruct the main development of recent debates on the local currency price stability of imports-and their implications for the international transmission and the optimal design of monetary policy-with the goal of clarifying our contribution to the literature. A core issue underlying these debates is whether monetary policy should react to international variables, such as the exchange rate or the terms of trade, beyond the infl uence that these variables have on the domestic output gap (for example, via external demand) and on the domestic good prices-so that it would have a specifi c "international dimension." As discussed in the following, models stressing the stability of import prices in local currency have provided one possible answer to this question stressing the implications of nominal rigidities for monetary transmission and stabilization policy.
Nominal Rigidities and the International Dimensions of Optimal Monetary Policy
At the heart of the international dimension of monetary policy lies the role of the exchange rate in the international transmission mechanism. Consistent with traditional open macroeconomic models, the seminal contribution to the New Open Economy Macroeconomics (henceforth NOEM) by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) embraces the view that exchange rate movements play the stabilizing role of adjusting international relative prices in response to shocks, when frictions prevent or slow down price adjustment in the local currency. The idea is that nominal depreciation transpires into real depreciation, making domestic goods cheaper in the world markets, hence redirecting world demand toward them: exchange rate movements therefore have "expenditure switching effects." Accordingly, NOEM contributions after Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) draw on the Mundell-Fleming and Keynesian tradition, and posit that fi rms preset the price for their products in domestic currency, implying that export prices are sticky in the currency of the producers-this is why such hypothesis is commonly dubbed "producer currency pricing" (henceforth PCP). Under this hypothesis, nominal import prices in local currency move one-to-one with the exchange rate and pass-through is perfect. In the baseline model with preset prices, to the extent that the demand elasticities are identical across countries, there is no incentive for producers to charge different prices in different markets: in equilibrium there would be no deviations from the law of one price even if national markets were segmented.
In model economies with PCP, optimal monetary policy rules tend to be "inward-looking" (and isomorphic to the rules derived in closed economy models): welfare-maximizing central banks pursue the stabilization of domestic producers marginal costs and markups-hence, they aim at stabilizing the GDP defl ator-while letting the consumer price index (CPI) fl uctuate with efficient movements in the relative price of imports. There is no need for monetary policies to react to international variables-a result that in the baseline NOEM model after Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) goes through under different assumptions regarding nominal rigidities, including staggered price setting and partial adjustment (see, for example, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002), or Benigno and Benigno (2003) for a generalization of the baseline model).
The high elasticity of import prices to the exchange rate underlying the contributions after Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) , however, is clearly at odds with a large body of empirical studies showing that the exchange rate passthrough on import prices is far from complete in the short run, and deviations from the law of one price are large and persistent (see, for example, Engel and Rogers [1996] ; Goldberg and Knetter [1997]; Campa and Goldberg [2005] ). Based on this evidence, several contributions have engaged in a thorough critique of the received wisdom on the expenditure switching effects of the exchange rate. Specifi cally, Betts and Devereux (2000) and Devereux and Engel (2003) , among others, posit that fi rms preset export prices in the currency of the market where they sell their goods. This assumption, commonly dubbed "local currency pricing" (henceforth LCP), attributes local currency price stability of imports entirely to nominal frictions. The far-reaching implications of LCP for the role of the exchange rate in the international transmission mechanism have been widely discussed by the literature (see, e.g., Engel [2003] ).
To the extent that import prices are sticky in the local currency, a Home depreciation does not affect the price of Home goods in the world markets; hence, it has no expenditure switching effects. Instead, it raises the ex-post markups on Home exports: at given marginal costs, revenues in domestic currency from selling goods abroad rise. In contrast with the received wisdom, nominal depreciation strengthens a country's terms of trade: if export prices are preset during the period, the Home terms of trade improves when the Home currency weakens.
As opposed to earlier literature, models assuming LCP unveil a clear-cut argument in favor of policies with an "international dimension." One way to present the argument is as follows. To the extent that exporters' revenues and markups are exposed to exchange rate uncertainty, fi rms' optimal pricing strategies internalize the monetary policy of the importing country. In the benchmark model by Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) for instance, foreign fi rms optimally preset the price of their goods in the Home market one period ahead, by charging the equilibrium markup over expected marginal costs evaluated in Home currency. The preset price of Home imports then depends on the joint distribution of Home monetary policy and Foreign productivity shocks: in the model, it is increasing in the variance of nominal marginal costs.
The reason why the isomorphism between closed economy and open economy monetary rules breaks down is apparent. Suppose that the Home monetary authorities ignore the infl uence of their decisions on the price of Home imports. Incomplete stabilization of Foreign fi rms' marginal costs and markup in local currency will translate into inefficiently high local prices of their product. On the other hand, if Home monetary authorities wanted to stabilize Foreign fi rms' marginal costs, they could only do so at the cost of raising costs and markup uncertainty for Home producers, resulting in inefficient Home good prices. It follows that, to maximize Home welfare, Home policymakers should optimally trade-off the stabilization of marginal costs of all producers (domestic and foreign) selling in the Home markets. The optimal response to Foreign shocks by domestic policymakers depends, among other factors, on the degree of openness of the economy, as indexed by the overall share of imports in the CPI (see Corsetti and Pesenti [2005] , and Sutherland [2005] , for a discussion of intermediate degrees of passthrough).
In section 6.7 of this chapter we will show that these basic principles of the international dimensions of optimal monetary policies go through in models assuming LCP and staggered price adjustment. Namely, in our model monetary authorities will optimally attempt to stabilize the CPI, although CPI stabilization will not be complete because of the asymmetry in shocks hitting different economies and different sectors of the same national economy, creating the need for relative price adjustment. At an optimum, welfaremaximizing policymakers will thus trade-off inefficient misalignment of import prices, with inefficient relative price dispersion among domestic and foreign goods (see also Smets and Wouters [2002] and Monacelli [2005] ).
Interactions of Nominal and Real Determinants of Local Currency Price Stability of Imports
While most of the discussion in the NOEM literature has focused on incomplete pass-through as an implication of nominal rigidities, a low passthrough, in itself, is not necessarily incompatible with expenditure switching effects-a point stressed by Obstfeld (2002) , among others. In this respect, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) point out that, in the data (and consistent with the received wisdom), nominal depreciation does tend to be associated with deteriorating terms of trade. This piece of evidence clearly sets an empirical hurdle for LCP models: specifi cations that assume a very high degree of price stickiness in local currency cannot pass this test (see Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc [2008a] , for a quantitative assessment). Interestingly, estimates of LCP models attributing incomplete pass-through exclusively to nominal rigidities in local currency tend to predict that the degree of price stickiness is implausibly higher for imports than for domestic goods-a result suggesting model misspecifi cation (see, for example, Lubik and Schorfheide [2006] ).
The key issue is the extent to which the evidence of local currency price stability of imports can be explained by nominal rigidities. In the literature, it is well understood that the low elasticity of import prices at the retail level, with respect to the exchange rate, is in large part due to the incidence of distribution (see Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo [2006] for a recent reconsideration of this point). Namely, suppose that import prices at the dock move one-to-one with the exchange rate, but the distribution margin accounts for 50 percent of the retail price, mostly covering local costs. A 1 percent depreciation of the currency will then affect the fi nal price of the imported good only by 0.5 percent.
In addition, several macro and micro contributions have emphasized that import prices at the dock do not move one-to-one with the exchange rate because of optimal destination-specifi c markup adjustment by monopolistic fi rms. Instances of these studies include Dornbusch (1987) , stressing market structure, as well as previous work by two of us (Corsetti and Dedola 2005) , where upstream monopolists sell their tradable goods to downstream fi rms, which combine them with local inputs before reaching the consumer. The latter contribution establishes that, to the extent that the tradable goods and the local inputs are not good substitutes in the downstream fi rms' production, the demand elasticity faced by upstream monopolists will be (a) market-specifi c, causing optimal price discrimination across markets, and (b) increasing in the monopolists price, thus leading to incomplete exchange rate pass-through independent of nominal rigidities. Based on this principle, that paper then generalizes the model with distribution by Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003) as to encompass local currency price stability due to endogenous movements of markups implied by the presence of distribution services intensive in local inputs. The same principle nonetheless can be applied to models where intermediate imported inputs are assembled using local inputs-a case analyzed by Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2003) . Whether one has in mind markets with high distribution margins (such as the market for cups of coffee at Starbucks in the United States), or markets for goods with a relatively high incidence of imported parts (such as the market for cars "made in the United States"), incomplete exchange rate passthrough can be traced back to some degree of complementarity between imported goods and local input/ services.
Analyses of the relative importance of these different sources of import price stability (especially local costs) are provided by several market-specifi c studies-such as Goldberg and Verboven (2001) , Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007) , and Hellerstein (2005) . The main result emerging from these partial equilibrium contributions is that real factors can explain a large extent of local currency price stability of imports. Most interestingly, similar conclusions can be reached using quantitative, general equilibrium models, as suggested by the numerical exercises in Corsetti and Dedola (2005) .
Yet quantitative studies incorporating these factors also corroborate the idea that a realistic degree of nominal rigidities can improve substantially the performance of the model. In Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2005) , we show that a model assuming LCP, together with vertical interaction between producers and distributors, can pass the empirical hurdle set by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) , provided that the average frequency of price adjustment is consistent with the evidence by Bils and Klenow (2004) .
Research is therefore increasingly focused on the interaction between real and monetary determinants of low exchange rate pass-through and deviations from the law of one price. A fi rst early instance of research focused on such interaction is provided by contributions that emphasize the need to treat the currency denomination of exports as an endogenous choice by profi t-maximizing fi rms. Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2005) , Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard (2004), and Friberg (1998) have developed models where fi rms can choose whether to price export in domestic or in foreign currency, knowing that price updates will be subject to frictions. A number of factors-from the market share of exporters to the incidence of distribution, and the availability of hedging instruments-potentially play a crucial role in this choice (see Engel (2006) for a synthesis).
Although most of these models are developed assuming an arbitrary monetary policy, the role of optimal stabilization policy in the choice between LCP and PCP is addressed by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) . The main idea is that expansionary monetary shocks unrelated to fundamental shocks (e.g., productivity) raise nominal wages and marginal costs while depreciating the currency. Consider a fi rm located in a country with noisy monetary policy; that is, hit by frequent monetary shocks unrelated to fundamentals. For such a fi rm, pricing its exports in foreign currency (i.e., choosing LCP) is attractive in the following sense: it ensures that revenues from exports in domestic currency will move in parallel with nominal marginal costs, with stabilizing effects on the markup. This is because any expansionary monetary shock depreciating the Home currency would simultaneously raise wages and the domestic currency revenue from unit sales abroad (at an unchanged local price). This observation may help explain why exporters from countries with relatively unstable domestic monetary policies (e.g., some developing countries) prefer to price their exports to developed countries in the importers' currency. The same argument, however, suggests that LCP is not necessarily optimal for exporters producing in countries where monetary policy systematically stabilizes marginal costs (see Goldberg and Tille [2008] for empirical evidence). For fi rms located in these countries, real factors arguably become more relevant in the choice.
A second instance of the new directions taken by the literature consists of studies taking the LCP choice as given, and combining it with different determinants of pricing to market and incomplete pass-through. This is the approach we take in this chapter. In contrast from previous contributions, where price stickiness is not linked to price discrimination (e.g., Monacelli 2005) , or where nominal rigidities and price discrimination coexist without feeding into each other (e.g., Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc 2005), we specify a model building on the intuitive idea that the frequency of price changes by local downstream fi rms selling products to consumers is bound to affect the elasticity of demand perceived by upstream producers of intermediate goods (or tradable inputs). The novel result of our study is that, looking at the interactions between nominal and real determinants of price discrimination in an otherwise standard monetary model, nominal rigidities at the retail level do not necessarily lower the equilibrium reaction of fi nal prices to exchange rate movements, thus increasing price inertia. As mentioned in the introduction, downstream price rigidities tend to generate strategic substitutability among upstream producers and an overall larger sensitivity of all prices to exchange rate changes.
The Model Economy
The world economy consists of two countries of equal size, H and F. Each country specializes in one type of tradable good, produced in a number of differentiated industries defi ned over a continuum of unit mass. Tradable goods are indexed by h ∈ [0, 1] in the Home country and f ∈ [0, 1] in the Foreign country. In each industry, the fi rm producing the tradable good h (or f ) is a monopolistic supplier of one good, using labor as the only input to production. These fi rms set prices in local currency units and in a staggered fashion as in Calvo (1983) .
A distinctive feature of our setting is that we model a downstream sector in each country. Specifi cally, we assume that each producer's good h is sold to consumers in many varieties by a continuum of local fi rms indexed by r h ∈ [0, 1]. These fi rms buy the h tradable goods and turn them into consumer goods-which are not traded across borders-with random productivity. We will distinguish between two cases: one in which local fi rms use domestic labor as an input; the other in which they do not. Similar to upstream producers, downstream also operate under monopolistic competition and set prices in a staggered fashion as in Calvo (1983) .
By the logic of the Calvo adjustment, local downstream fi rms buying goods from upstream producers charge different prices to fi nal users, with a constant fraction of them reoptimizing prices in each period. In principle, one could assume that upstream fi rms exercise their monopoly power by charging individual prices that are specifi c to each downstream fi rm. However, we fi nd it more realistic and convincing to assume that upstream producers are not able to price discriminate across individual local fi rms, but only across groups of them-namely, across domestic and foreign local fi rms. So we assume that upstream producers exercise their monopoly power and set prices by taking into account the total demand for their product in each market, at Home and in the Foreign country.
In what follows, we describe our setup, focusing on the Home country, with the understanding that similar expressions also characterize the Foreign economy-variables referred to Foreign fi rms and households are marked with an asterisk.
The Household's Problem

Preferences
The representative Home agent maximizes the expected value of her lifetime utility, given by the following standard functional form:
where instantaneous utility U is a function of a consumption index, C t ; leisure, (1 -L t ); and real money balances M tϩ1 / P t . Households consume both domestically produced and imported goods. We defi ne C t (h, r h ) as the Home agent's consumption as of time t of the variety r h of the Home good h, produced and distributed by the fi rm r h ; similarly, C t ( f, r f ) is the Home agent's consumption of the variety r f of the good f, produced and distributed by fi rm r f . For each good h (or f ), we assume that one fi nal good variety r h (r f ) is an imperfect substitute for all other fi nal good varieties, with constant elasticity of substitution Ͼ 1:
where C t (h) is the consumption of (all varieties of) the Home good h, by the Home agent, at time t; similarly, C t ( f ) is the same agent's consumption of the Foreign good f. We then assume that the good produced by the h industry is an imperfect substitute for all other goods produced by the Home industries, with the same constant elasticity of substitution Ͼ 1 as between fi nal good varieties. Aggregate consumption of Home and Foreign goods by the Home agent is thus defi ned as:
The full consumption basket, C t , in each country, aggregates Home and Foreign goods according to the following standard constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function:
(2)
where a H and a F are the weights on the consumption of Home and Foreign traded goods, respectively, and 1/ (1 -) is the constant elasticity of substitution between C H,t and C F,t .
Budget Constraints and Asset Markets
For simplicity, we posit that domestic and international asset markets are complete and that only domestic residents hold the Home currency, M tϩ1 . Households derive income from working, W t L t , from domestic fi rms' profi ts, and from previously accumulated units of currency, as well as from the proceeds from holding state-contingent assets, B t . They pay nondistortionary (lump-sum) net taxes T, denominated in Home currency. Households use their disposable income to consume and invest in state-contingent assets. The individual fl ow budget constraint for the representative agent j in the Home country is therefore:
where Π(.) denotes the agent's share of profi ts from all fi rms h and r in the economy. The price indexes are as follows: P H,t denotes the consumer price of the aggregate Home traded good; P F,t denotes the consumer price of aggregate Home imports. We will also denote the overall consumer price index (CPI) by P t . All these indexes are defi ned in the following.
The household's problem consists of maximizing lifetime utility, defi ned by (1), subject to the constraint (3).
Production Structure and Technology
International price discrimination is a key feature of the international economy captured by our model. In what follows we show that, even if Home and Foreign consumers have identical constant elasticity preferences for consumption, vertical interactions between upstream and downstream fi rms cause differences in the elasticity of demand for the h ( f ) product at wholesale level across national markets. Upstream fi rms will thus want to charge different prices at Home and in the Foreign country. We will focus our analysis on Home fi rms-optimal pricing by Foreign fi rms can be easily derived from it. To distinguish between upstream and downstream fi rms, we will denote variables referred to the former with an upper bar.
We begin by specifying the technology used by upstream fi rms producing Home tradables. These fi rms employ domestic labor to produce a differentiated product h according to the following linear production function:
where L ෆ(h) is the demand for labor by the producer of the good h and Z ෆ is a technology shock common to all upstream producers in the Home country, which follows a statistical process to be specifi ed later. The letter h will be indifferently referred to an upstream producer selling to downstream fi rms r h , or the corresponding "industry."
In each industry h, downstream fi rms r h combine the traded input, bought from upstream producers, with some local nontraded input. For analytical convenience, in most of our analysis we do not model the local nontraded input explicitly, but posit that the production function of fi rms r h is linear in the traded input only
where X (h, r h ) is the demand for tradable good h by fi rm r h , Z is a random technology component that affects the amount of traded input required to produce the variety r h and distribute it to consumers. This random shock is country-specifi c, and hits symmetrically all national downstream fi rms. The use of the local input is consequential for our results, to the extent that it is a poor substitute with X. This case has been made in previous work of ours (see Corsetti and Dedola [2005] ; Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc [2005] ) in which we have assumed that downstream fi rms in an industry h combine the tradable good h with a local input according to a fi xed-proportion production function, such as
Here, L(h, r h ) is the demand for labor by the downstream fi rm r h , and the random technology component Z now affects the amount of labor required to produce the variety r h and distribute it to consumers. In our previous contributions, we have shown that this specifi cation can generate endogenous movements in upstream fi rms' markups and crossborder price discrimination independent of nominal price rigidities. In this chapter, we make a different, but complementary, point. Namely, we show that vertical interactions among upstream and downstream fi rms can lead to price discrimination exclusively as a consequence of nominal rigidities. To focus sharply on the mechanism underlying this new result, throughout our analysis we specify the production function of downstream fi rms as in (4), abstracting from the local nontraded input. For the sake of comparison, however, in the next sections we will also show analytical results for the production function (5).
The Problem of Downstream Firms
Both upstream and downstream fi rms are subject to nominal rigidities à la Calvo. Hence, at any time t downstream fi rms will buy either from a producer h, which updates its price in the same period, or from a producer still charging an old price. Conversely, in each period, upstream producers updating their price will need to consider that only a fraction of downstream fi rms buying their products will also reoptimize in the period. In characterizing optimal pricing decisions, it is instructive to go over these cases one by one. Let be the probability that a downstream fi rm within the industry h keeps its price fi xed-in each period a fi rm r h sets a new price with probability (1 -). The corresponding probabilities for the upstream producers will be denoted by ෆ and (1 -ෆ ). Consider fi rst the optimization problem of the downstream fi rms, r h , which can reset their product prices in the current period t. The representative fi rm r h chooses P t (h, r h ) to maximize the expected discounted sum of profi ts:
where p bt,tϩk is the fi rm's stochastic nominal discount factor between t and t ϩ k. This fi rm faces the following fi nal demand:
where P t (h) is the price index of the good (or industry) h, and P H,t is the price index of all Home goods. The optimal price charged to consumers can then be written in the following standard form:
where, depending on whether we consider (4) or (5), the fi rm's marginal cost, MC t (h), will be given by either of the following expressions:
where P ෆ t (h) is the price of good h charged by the producer in the industry. Now, if the downstream fi rm operates in an industry in which the upstream producer does not reoptimize its product price during the period, the price P ෆ t (h) in the previous expression will coincide with the price charged in the previous period; that is, P ෆ t (h) ϭ P ෆ t-1 (h). Conversely, if the downstream fi rm r h operates in an industry h in which the upstream fi rm has also reset the price of its product during the same period, the marginal cost will be depending on the new, optimized price, discussed in the following section. This has the noteworthy implication that downstream fi rms in different industries will be facing different marginal costs even in the face of common productivity shocks Z t -a key feature of our model that will be important in determining the characteristics of the optimal monetary policy.
Price Indexes and Market Clearing
Price Indexes
Before getting to the analytical core of our contribution and delving into our numerical experiments, we conclude the presentation of the model by formally defi ning the price indexes repeatedly used in the analysis so far, and writing down the market-clearing conditions in the goods market. In an industry in which the producer updates its price, the price index of the good h at consumer level is given by. 5
Denoting with a tilde the prices in an industry in which the producer does not update its price, the price index is:
The price index of Home tradables consumed at home thus becomes:
Ϫ1 . The price index associated with the consumption basket, C t , is:
] (Ϫ1)/ . 5. We drop the index r h in our notation of the optimal fi nal prices, since in any given industry fi rms that can update their price will choose the same optimal one. Let E t denote the Home nominal exchange rate, expressed in units of Home currency per unit of Foreign currency. The real exchange rate is costumarily defi ned as the ratio of CPIs expressed in the same currency; that is, E t P t * /P t . The terms of trade are instead defi ned as the relative price of domestic imports in terms of exports, namely P F,t / E t P * H,t .
Equilibrium in the Goods Market
To characterize the equilibrium conditions in the goods market, we equate supply to demand at each fi rm level. Integrating over all downstream fi rms in a given industry we get:
where S t (h) denotes industry h's relative price dispersion at the consumer level:
Integrating over all industries, aggregate output is:
where the price dispersion term, S ෆ t , is defi ned as:
Observe that S ෆ t captures the relative price dispersion within and across industries. Because S ෆ t and S t (h) are bounded below by 1, price dispersion implies a real resource cost.
Modeling the Sources of Local Currency Price Stability: Price Discrimination and Nominal Rigidities
In this section we fully characterize pricing to market by upstream fi rms as a function of fi nal prices. A crucial feature of our model is that the demand price elasticity perceived by upstream producers is time varying as a function of downstream price infl ation. Because results differ depending on the specifi cation of the downstream fi rms' production function, we will characterize the optimal producer price P ෆ t o (h), and discuss its main properties, looking fi rst at the case of downstream linear (Cobb-Douglas) production, then at the case of downstream Leontief production. Consistent with the logic of the Calvo model, we posit that, when upstream producers update their prices, they do so simultaneously in the Home and in the Foreign market, in the respective currencies. The maximization problem is then as follows:
where the marginal cost of the producer is given by:
and, depending on the production function downstream, the Home and Foreign demands for the fi rm's variety are given by:
in our linear production specifi cation, or
for the case of Leontief production function. In these expressions, P t * (h) and P * H,t denote the price index of industry h and of Home goods, respectively, in the Foreign country, expressed in Foreign currency. In comparing the two sets of the previous demands, recall that in the linear production case (4) the fi rm's productivity affects the quantity of tradable good h needed to satisfy a given fi nal demand for each variety r h : hence, the demand for the monopolist's product is scaled by productivity.
For each industry h, we can write the relative price dispersion at the consumer level as: 6 Using this result, we can rewrite the demand faced by each upstream producer as a function of price dispersion. In other words, 6. See appendix for details. the producer's demand curve depends on the price dispersion at the consumer level, induced by infrequent price adjustment by downstream fi rms. 7 By the fi rst-order condition of the producer's problem, the optimal price P ෆ t o (h) in domestic currency charged to domestic downstream fi rms is:
; while the price (in foreign currency) charged to downstream fi rms in the foreign country is:
where the elasticities
summarize how the price set by the producer as of t, will affect the choice of downstream fi rms that will have a chance to change their prices in the current period and in the future. Now, it is well understood that when P ෆ t (h) and P ෆ t * (h) are sticky in local currency, exchange rate movements translate into systematic violation of the law of one price. However, comparing the expressions for the optimal prices, it is apparent that the law of one price is bound to be systematically violated even when the fi rm has a chance to reset its prices, refl ecting differences in the two market elasticities ε(h) and ε * (h). In this respect, it is worth emphasizing that in our economy, deviations from the law of one price across markets are not an exclusive implication of nominal rigidities in local currency. They also depend on the way vertical interactions among upstream and downstream monopolists affect optimal pricing by producers, as shown in the following.
Demand Price Elasticities, Price Variability, and Strategic Interactions
We now characterize the elasticities in equation (9) for our specifi cation in which the downstream fi rms' production function is linear in the traded good, as in equation (4), and discuss its main properties and implications for pricing. The derivative of the producer's demand with respect to its own price is: 7. In the Leontief case, for instance, the demand curve can be written as:
where the partial derivative ∂P o tϩk (h)/ ∂P ෆ t (h) captures the extent to which current and future optimal pricing decision by fi rms r h are affected by the current producer pricing decision-here, P o tϩk (h) denotes the optimal price set by the downstream fi rms, which will reoptimize in each period t ϩ k, while facing the traded input price P ෆ t (h).
In the appendix, we show that this derivative is simply equal to the ratio of the two prices themselves; for example, at time t we have ∂P t
Using this fact, the impact on current and future demand of a price change by the producer can be simplifi ed as follows: 8
The sum ∑ k sϭ0 s (P o tϩk-s (h)/ P tϩk (h))in the second line of this expression refl ects the fact that, when setting the optimal price as of t, upstream monopolists internalize its effects on fi nal demand in each future period between t and t ϩ k. Observe that in the last line in the previous expression, this sum has been substituted out using the defi nition of S tϩk (h). 9 8. We note here that this result is due to the fact that for prices P tϩk reset optimally as of
, ∀s Ͼ 0, and
See appendix for details. 9. Namely:
Using again the defi nition of S tϩk (h), the price elasticity of demand at each point in time as perceived by the producer ε tϩk (h) becomes:
This demand elasticity is a function of the producer price P ෆ t (h) only indirectly, through the impact of P o tϩk (h) on the fi nal price level P tϩk (h): absent downstream nominal rigidities ( ϭ 0), the price elasticity of the producer would be constant and proportional to that perceived by the downstream fi rm, -the fi nal price charged would simply be [/ ( -1)]P ෆ t (h)/ Z t .
In equation (9), the implications for the demand elasticity of nominal rigidities at the downstream level are captured by the negative term inside the brackets. An important and novel result is that the demand price elasticity perceived by upstream fi rms under sticky prices is time varying and, up to fi rst order 10 a decreasing function of the cumulated rate of infl ation at the consumer level, P tϩk (h)/ P t-1 (h). Namely, with positive infl ation such elasticity will be lower than with fl exible prices (in which case it is constant and equal to ). Any change in the consumer prices within a specifi c h industry-either in response to productivity shocks hitting downstream fi rms, or in response to price changes by the upstream fi rms-modifi es the elasticity of the demand faced by upstream producers in the same industry. A notable implication is that differences in national infl ation rates will induce differences in demand price elasticities for a product, creating an incentive for producers to price-to-market across borders.
To provide an intuitive account of these results, observe that, from the vantage point of an upstream producer of tradables h, the marginal revenue from a price change refl ects the fact that only some downstream fi rms update their prices in any given period. Specifi cally, the upstream monopolist does not know which individual fi rm r h will be updating its price in the period, but knows that a fraction 1 -of them will do so, while a fraction will keep their price unchanged. Because of the latter, the upstream producers will optimally respond to shocks to own marginal costs by charging a price that is higher than she or he would ideally charge if all downstream producers set new prices.
This leads to strategic substitutability among producers: namely, a rise in their marginal costs will lead to an increase in the desired markups by pro-10. We show in the following that up to fi rst-order price dispersion S t (h) is equal to 1 around a zero infl ation steady state. ducers. Strategic substitutability in our model is important because it implies that producer prices will be more reactive to shocks to their demand conditions and to marginal costs: when vertical interactions among fi rms with sticky prices are considered, it may not be necessarily the case that several layers of nominal rigidities bring about more inertia in prices.
It is worth stressing that, if monetary policy stabilized consumer prices completely, removing any within-industry price dispersion for each good h, such policy would make the producer's demand elasticity and thus its desired markup constant. To wit: in this case, the producer's demand elasticity would be given by (1 -kϩ1 ). Through price stabilization, monetary authorities would therefore eliminate the incentive to price discriminate. However, observe that the elimination of consumer price variability (and consumer price dispersion) would not make the producer's markups independent of downstream price rigidities. The steady-state markup of upstream fi rms would still be a function of , and equal to / ( -(1 -␤ ෆ )/ (1 -)), implying that the steady-state elasticity is lower than , and equal to
Infl ation Variability, Optimal Markups, and Exchange Rate Pass-Through
To characterize further fi rms' equilibrium behavior, we log-linearize expression (8) around a zero infl ation steady-state. Using standard procedures, the optimal price charged by updating upstream producers can be approximated as follows:
where in turn the elasticity as of t is approximately given by
with t (h) denoting downstream infl ation deviations from steady state in sector h. Because downstream infl ation changes depend on the fi nal price set by fi rms adjusting during the period
it is clear that the elasticity ε t (h) will ultimately be a decreasing function of the upstream price. Using the difference equation for optimally reset downstream prices,
we can characterize downstream infl ation in each industry h as
and thus derive a dynamic expression for the optimal pricing by upstream fi rms:
The term 1 -ε ss / (ε ss -1) (1 -␤) (1 -␤ ෆ ) 2 in the denominator of the previous expression is lower than 1. 11 This means that, as already discussed, the time varying elasticity due to downstream nominal rigidities will transpire into a larger response of the optimal price to changes in marginal costs, relative to the case in which the upstream price elasticity is constant. Now the price charged to foreign downstream fi rms by domestic upstream producers will be: The coefficient multiplying exchange rate deviations Eˆt in this expression, which we write for convenience here 11 . It is also possible to show that this term will be positive as long as the upstream markup is not too large. A sufficient condition is that
Optimal Monetary Policy and Sources of Local-Currency Price Stability 341 measures the structural exchange rate pass-through, as defi ned in Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2005) . This coefficient highlights the two mechanisms determining how exchange rate movements are passed through into local prices according to our analysis. On the one hand, upstream nominal rigidities ( ෆ Ͼ 0) tend to lower short-run pass-through irrespective of vertical interactions. But, as we previously noted, downstream nominal rigidities ( Ͼ 0) lower the denominator in the prior expression below 1 because of strategic substitutability. Thus, the response of the optimal price to exchange rate changes will be stronger when the elasticity is time varying due to downstream nominal rigidities, relative to the case of a constant elasticity. For instance, if upstream prices were fully fl exible-corresponding to ෆ ϭ 0the structural pass-through coefficient would be larger than 1 per effect of the vertical interactions with downstream sticky price fi rms. However, for any given value of , a sufficiently large ෆ will generally reduce exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) below 100 percent in the short run-unless the upstream steady-state markup is unreasonably large. 12
Price Rigidities Versus Local Costs (the Leontief Technology Case)
As already mentioned, in previous work (Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc 2005) we have analyzed a different model specifi cation, assuming that the production function of the downstream fi rm includes a local input, which is a poor substitute for the traded intermediate goods. We showed that the demand price elasticity faced by upstream producers is also market-specifi c in this case (independently of nominal rigidities). The properties of this model are, however, quite different from the ones discussed so far. In the rest of this subsection, we analyze these differences within a single analytical framework. Our main conclusion is that the presence of local inputs (which are weak substitutes for intermediate goods) in downstream production leads to an attenuation of the main effect of price stickiness on upstream producers' optimal markups, without necessarily overturning it.
When the technology of the downstream fi rms is as in equation (5), the derivative of the producer demand with respect to its price becomes: 12. Precisely, it can be shown that a sufficient condition for the ERPT coefficient to be less than one is that:
If it is also assumed that the markup is not too large (e.g., ε ss / (ε ss -1) Յ 2␤), which is reasonable for ␤ close to 1, then a sufficient condition for incomplete ERPT in the short run is:
Finally, observe that the ERPT coefficient is also a nonmonotonic function of the degree of downstream price rigidity, .
This is similar to the expression derived for the linear case, except that the right-hand side is not scaled by downstream fi rms' productivity. After some simplifi cations (detailed in the appendix), the derivative of the fi nal price to the producer price can be shown to be a constant depending on . Evaluating this derivative at time t we can write: 13
Intuitively, the effect of an increase in the upstream producer price (and thus of the marginal cost) on the price optimally charged by downstream fi rms in the same period will be proportional to the markup charged by the latter, / ( -1); a clear instance of double marginalization. The derivative of current and future demands with respect to the wholesale price becomes: 14
13. Using the same reasoning as in the appendix and the fact that ∂MC tϩk (h)/ ∂P ෆ t (h) ϭ 1, and
14. The following is due to the fact that for retail prices P tϩk reset as of t ϩ k, it will still be true that ∂MC tϩkϩs (h)/ ∂P ෆ t (h) ϭ 1 and
Moreover, defi ne:
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The price elasticity of demand at each point in time as perceived by the upstream producer is then given by:
where again it is true that
In contrast to the linear production case, the demand elasticity is now a function of the wholesale price P ෆ t (h) not only indirectly, through the fi nal price index P tϩk (h), but also directly. Specifi cally, this elasticity refl ects three effects.
The fi rst arises from the double marginalization due to the presence of two vertically integrated monopolists and is captured by the term / ( -1) in (10): absent nominal rigidities ( ϭ 0) and the nontraded input among downstream fi rms, the price elasticity of the producer would be constant and equal to that perceived by these fi rms, -the price charged to consumers by all fi rms would simply be / ( -1)P ෆ t (h).
The second effect, arising from nominal rigidities, is captured by the term in brackets in (10) and has already been discussed extensively in the previous subsection-it links the demand elasticity to downstream price infl ation and price dispersion among fi nal producers. Its presence tends to make the demand elasticity an increasing function of P ෆ t (h).
The third and last effect arises from the assumption that downstream fi rms combine the traded and labor inputs in fi xed proportion and is captured by the term P ෆ t (h)/ P tϩk (h): absent downstream nominal rigidities this ratio would be equal to P ෆ t (h)/ (( / ( -1)(P ෆ t (h) ϩ W t / Z t )), as in Corsetti and Dedola (2005) . However, in contrast to our previous results, this last effect tends to make the demand elasticity decreasing in P ෆ t (h).
Summing up: our analysis suggests that price stickiness and local inputs, which are complement to intermediate tradables in fi nal good production, affect producers' markups in different ways: the former makes the producers' demand elasticity decreasing, the latter increasing, in the producer price. Under what conditions would one effect prevail over the other?
Taking a log-linear approximation to the upstream price and the elasticity, we fi nd as before that
where the elasticity as of t is now given by:
Relative to our previous analysis, this steady-state elasticity depends on ␦, which is defi ned as the steady-state share of the upstream product in the downstream fi rms' costs, with 0 Ͻ 1 -␦ Ͻ 1. Because downstream marginal cost can be approximated as
the expression for the optimal upstream price becomes:
The denominator of the coefficient multiplying marginal costs can now have either sign; that is, the time varying elasticity can either magnify or mute the response of the optimal upstream price to marginal costs. This means that we can have either strategic substitutability (the denominator is negative, as was in the previous subsection) or strategic complementarity (positive). A sufficient condition for strategic complementarity is:
In other words, the share of local inputs in downstream fi rms should be sufficiently high. Observe that the previous inequality is more likely to hold when is low (markups are high), or is low, so that downstream prices are not too sticky.
Calibration
This section describes the benchmark calibration for our numerical experiments, which we assume symmetric across countries. We used Dynareϩϩ to solve for the optimal monetary policy and to simulate our different economies. In each exercise, we report statistics averaged over 500 simulations of 100 periods each.
Preferences and Production
We posit that the period-by-period utility function has the form already shown by equation (1), that we reproduce here for convenience:
We set κ so that in steady state, one-third of the time endowment is spent working. In our benchmark calibration, we assume υ equal to (risk aversion), which we in turn set to 2. Because the utility function is separable in consumption and real money balances, money demand is determined residually and does not play any role in our results. We therefore set arbitrarily to 0.1. We set the constant elasticity of substitution across brands, , so that the markup of downstream fi rms in steady state is 15 percent. Following Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) , we chose so that the trade elasticity is 1.5. As regards the weights of domestic and foreign tradables in the consumption basket, a H and a F (normalized a H ϩ a F ϭ 1) are set such that imports are 10 percent of aggregate output in steady state, roughly in line with the average ratio for the United States in the last thirty years. We pick the steady-state value of Z to ensure that the price of traded goods accounts for 50 percent of the fi nal price in steady state. This value corresponds to the empirical estimates by Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003) for the distribution margin only. In our specifi cation, downstream fi rms can do more than distribute goods to fi nal users, suggesting that the value we select is on the conservative side.
As benchmark, we set the probability that upstream and downstream fi rms update their prices to 0.5. This overall frequency of price adjustment is in line with the evidence in Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) , if sales are treated as price changes.
Productivity Shocks
Let the vector Z ϵ {Z, Z ෆ, Z * , Z ෆ * ෆ} represent the sectoral technology shocks in the domestic and foreign economies. We assume that sectoral disturbances to technology follow a trend-stationary AR(1) process
whereas u has variance-covariance matrix V(u), and is a 4ϫ4 matrix of coefficients describing the autocorrelation properties of the shocks, that are the same for both sectoral shocks. Since we assume a symmetric economic structure across countries, we also impose symmetry on the autocorrelation and variance-covariance matrices of the previous process. Because of lack of sectoral data on productivity, we posit that sectoral shocks follow a rather conventional process. First, in line with most of the international business cycle literature-for example, Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992)-we assume that these shocks are very persistent, and set their autocorrelation to 0.95. Second, the standard deviation of the innovations is set to 0.007. For simplicity, we set the shock correlation and the spillovers across countries and sectors to zero.
Monetary Policy
To characterize the optimal monetary policy, we let the planner choose the growth rates of money in the Home and Foreign economies, to maximize the world welfare subject to the fi rst-order conditions for households and fi rms and the economy-wide resource constraints. We assume that the planner places equal weights on Home and Foreign welfare, so that world welfare is given by the following expression:
where V 0 and V * 0 do not take into account utility accruing from real balances in (11). We follow an approach similar to that in Khan, King, and Wolman (2003) and consider an optimal policy that has been in place for a long enough time that initial conditions do not matter. When solving our economies, we assume the presence of fi scal subsidies, fi nanced via lumpsum taxation, to ensure that all prices would equal marginal costs if prices were fully fl exible.
In describing our results, we also compare the optimal policy to other well-known policy rules. We fi rst consider a Taylor-type rule that sets the short-term nominal interest rate as a function of the deviations of CPI infl ation and real GDP from steady-state values:
We conventionally parameterize the policy rule using the estimates in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) : ϭ 0.84, ϭ 2.19, ␥ ϭ 0.3. We also consider infl ation targeting rules in which the central bank stabilizes either the infl ation rate at the fi nal or intermediate level, which we label CPI and GDP infl ation targeting, respectively. 15
The Response of Producers and Consumer Prices to Shocks
In this section, we use our quantitative framework to discuss key properties of our model regarding the behavior of prices and markups in response to productivity shocks. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the impulse responses of prices, markups, and infl ation-all in percentage deviations from their Fig. 6 .1 Productivity shock to home upstream production steady-state values-to productivity shocks, distinguishing between the intermediate and fi nal production sectors. Throughout these exercises we assume that central banks in the two countries set monetary policy to implement a strict CPI infl ation targeting. Similar results can be obtained however, assuming that central banks implement the optimal policy, discussed in the next section. 6.1 (cont.) Optimal Monetary Policy and Sources of Local-Currency Price Stability 349 6.6.1 Technology Shocks to Upstream Firms Figure 6 .1 focuses on the effects of an unexpected and persistent productivity increase in the Home tradable goods sector. Consistent with strict infl ation targeting, the monetary authorities react to the shock by expanding the country's monetary stance in line with productivity, causing a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate-given CPI infl ation targeting, the nominal and real exchange rate move together (see the graph in the lower right corner of fi gure 6.1).
As shown by fi gure 6.1, upstream producers that update their prices lower them both in the domestic and the foreign market (see the fi rst chart on the upper left corner of the fi gure). The fall in the home good price is, however, Fig. 6.2 (cont.) Optimal Monetary Policy and Sources of Local-Currency Price Stability 351 larger abroad than in the domestic market, in violation of the law of one price. In the graph, a positive deviation from the law of one price means that domestic prices are higher than foreign prices.
The behavior of prices is mirrored by the response of the desired and actual markups of the upstream Home producers, shown by the fourth and fi fth graphs of fi gure 6.1. As discussed in section 6.4, downstream nominal rigidities lead to pricing substitutability at the level of upstream producers. As a result, the desired markup by these producers fall with their prices in either market, but relatively more in the Foreign one. 16 Nonetheless, since prices are sticky in local currency, the nominal depreciation of the Home exchange rate raises export revenues in the exporters' own currency: the average markup in the country actually rises.
The impact of the same shock on consumer prices clearly differs, depending on whether the upstream monopolist in a particular industry h updates its price, or leaves it unchanged. In the former case (shown in the second graph of fi gure 6.1), downstream fi rms face a drop in their marginal costs. Hence, those fi rms that can reset prices will lower them, both domestically and abroad. As we have seen previously, the intermediate good price falls more in the Foreign country. Thus, Foreign downstream fi rms decrease their price by more than the domestic ones, so that deviations from the law of one price have the same sign at both consumer prices' and producer prices' level.
Interestingly, our results show that consumer prices fall also in industries in which the upstream producers do not update their prices during the period-albeit by a smaller amount than in the other case (see the third graph of fi gure 6.1). This is so for two reasons. First, although marginal costs of downstream fi rms in these industries do not fall in the period, these fi rms nonetheless take into account that the productivity shock is persistent: they thus anticipate that their marginal costs are likely to decrease in the future. Second, a lower price helps these fi rms respond to increasing competition by fi rms operating in the other industries, where the price of intermediate product have already gone down.
In these industries, the deviations from the law of one price are larger, but of the opposite sign, relative to the industries in which the upstream price is updated. This is because, for a constant upstream price, consumer prices decrease on impact by more at Home than abroad. To wit: in the fi rst period, the sign of the deviations from the law of one price is positive in the second graph, and negative in the third graph of fi gure 6.1. 6.6.2 Technology Shocks to Downstream Firms Figure 6 .2 displays the responses to an unexpected persistent increase in the productivity of Home downstream fi rms. As in the previous case, under 16 . Recall that we also show that this result is attenuated when the production function includes local labor input, with a low degree of substitutability with the intermediate tradable goods. the assumed strict CPI infl ation targeting the Home monetary authorities react with an expansion, which leads to nominal and real depreciation of the Home currency (see last graph of fi gure 6.2).
Recall that downstream technology shocks are also country-specifi c: they lower the marginal costs of downstream fi rms at Home, but do not affect the costs of downstream fi rms in the industry located in the Foreign country. So, in all industries in which the upstream producers do not update their current price within the period, domestic downstream fi rms updating their prices will optimally lower them, while downstream fi rms abroad will keep their prices virtually unchanged. This is at the root of the deviations from the law of one price shown in the third graph of fi gure 6.2, which are further magnifi ed by the fact that monetary authorities react to the shock by engineering Home currency depreciation.
More complex is the case of industries in which upstream producers change their prices (second graph in the fi gure), since the overall effects of the shock will depend on a number of general equilibrium effects. Key to understanding these effects is the fact that higher productivity by downstream fi rms causes an increase in their output, and thus in real domestic consumption. In our model specifi cation, the increase in downstream output does not affect the labor market and thus the real wage directly-under the linear production function previously specifi ed, a higher downstream output has no direct impact on the demand for labor, since these fi rms are assumed not to employ any labor input. However, it does so indirectly: higher domestic consumption is associated with a positive income effect, which reduces labor supply and ultimately translates into a downward shift in hours worked. Given that at the same time the demand for intermediate products is increasing, the labor market tightens, causing a rise in real wages. Facing higher labor costs, upstream fi rms that can reoptimize their prices raise them, thus increasing the marginal costs of downstream fi rms. Somewhat surprisingly, as shown in the second graph of fi gure 6.2, the feedback effect on consumer prices is positive.
This transmission mechanism was discussed early on by Friedman, in his celebrated critical analysis of cost-push infl ation (see, e.g., Nelson [2007] and references within). In the industries where upstream producers adjust their prices, they raise them in response to higher costs in the form of higher nominal wages. Yet one key factor raising wages is the demand expansion engineered by monetary policymakers in response to productivity improvement at retail level. Changes in prices that appear to be motivated by costs consideration are actually the result of a demand stimulus working its way up through the vertical links between downstream and upstream producers, and ultimately raising the price of scarce production inputs supplied in competitive markets.
Observe that domestic upstream producers slightly lower their wholesale prices in foreign currency. Nonetheless, because of currency deprecia-tion, these prices in Home currency are higher than the ones charged in the domestic market, again in violation of the law of one price. Consistently, the desired markup of Home producers increases in the Home market, while it falls abroad-in line with the change in prices. The average markup nonetheless falls everywhere in the economy, per effect of nominal rigidities.
International Dimensions of Optimal Stabilization Policy
This section is devoted to the analysis of stabilization policies under the assumption of cooperation between the Home and Foreign monetary authorities and full commitment. In order to shed light on how policy works in our model, we fi nd it useful to discuss the problem of stabilizing economies hit by shocks to upstream or downstream shocks in isolation, and then proceed to present results for our complete baseline calibration. Thus, results are shown in three tables. For a set of macrovariables, table 6.1 and 6.2 report volatilities conditional on shocks to upstream and downstream productivity, respectively; table 6.3 reports results when both shocks are considered. In each table, the fi rst column shows the result for the fl exible price benchmark, in which monetary policy targets a zero rate of CPI infl ation at all times; the other columns refer to economies with price rigidities under different policy regimes. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 only show results under the optimal cooperative policy, including a case in which there is no home bias in consumption expenditure (i.e., a H ϭ a F ϭ 1/ 2). Table 6 .3, instead, includes the alternative monetary policies specifi ed in section 6.5-CPI infl ation targeting, GDP infl ation targeting, and the Taylor-type rule. As we assume subsidies that exactly offset steady-state markups, under the optimal policy long-run infl ation is zero. To facilitate comparison across experiments, we also posit that steady-state infl ation is nil when solving the model under the alternative policies.
Upstream Shocks Only
Starting from the simplest case, consider fi rst the problem of stabilizing technology shocks to upstream production only. As an important benchmark, we fi rst establish that, if our Home country were a closed economy, monetary authorities would be able to stabilize completely upstream marginal costs, and therefore upstream prices, preventing any dispersion in the prices charged by adjusting and nonadjusting fi rms. Monetary authorities can do so by matching any change in upstream marginal costs driven by productivity with a change in the monetary stance in the opposite direction, which ultimately moves nominal wages in tandem with productivity. The specifi c reason why such a policy would stabilize all sticky prices (at both producer and consumer level) is that, in our specifi cation, fl uctuations in nominal wages are not consequential for downstream fi rms, by virtue of our assumption that these fi rms employ no labor resources in producing fi nal goods. So, downstream marginal costs only change with the intermediate goods' prices, or with downstream productivity: without shocks to the latter, once upstream prices are constant in equilibrium, so are downstream prices. Similarly to the standard closed economy monetary model, the policy just described would replicate the allocation under fl exible prices-this policy is optimal in our environment since we assume that steady-state monopolistic distortions in production are corrected with fi scal instruments. 17 The optimality of complete price stabilization, however, does not carry over to an open economy setting, as shown in table 6.1. With an optimal monetary policy in place (second column of the table), the variability of the CPI is close to, but not zero-domestic and imported goods prices are actually much more variable than the CPI. Observe that prices and markups in both countries fl uctuate much less for domestic goods than for imported goods. This corresponds to the fact that monetary policymakers concentrate their efforts to reduce the volatility of markups of domestic producers selling in the domestic markets. The reason has already been laid out in section 6.2.1, but is worth reconsidering here in the framework of our model with staggered price setting.
By mirroring the logic of Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), assume an equilibrium where there is no price dispersion in either domestic market for domestically produced goods: the monetary authority completely stabilizes the marginal costs of upstream fi rms, once again matching any increase in productivity with an appropriate expansion in the Home monetary stance. While domestic goods prices remain constant and identical to each other, at both intermediate and fi nal level, any monetary decision affecting the nominal exchange rate would create import price dispersion at consumer level (since a fraction ෆ of Foreign producers would react to, for example, Home depreciation, by raising the price they charge to Home downstream fi rms). At the margin, depending on the degree of openness of the economy, it would be optimal to move away from such equilibrium. Specifi cally, it is efficient to stabilize the marginal costs of domestic intermediate producers by less, as to reduce the incentive to move prices in the import sector. Monetary authorities can raise welfare by trading-off lower import price 17. It is worth stressing that, had we assumed that downstream fi rms use labor, complete stability of upstream prices would be incompatible with complete stability of downstream prices. Even if prices of intermediate goods were held constant, movements in nominal wages in response to endogenous monetary policy changes would additionally affect marginal costs of fi nal good producers, creating an immediate incentive for these to reset prices when possible, thus generating price variability at the retail level. As a result, relative to our baseline model specifi cation, introducing a labor input in fi nal good production implies that welfaremaximizing monetary authorities would face a trade-off between stabilization of upstream marginal costs and downstream price dispersion. They would therefore tend to react by less to upstream productivity shocks, with the objective of containing price dispersion at consumer level. As should become clear in the rest of the text, abstracting from labor inputs in downstream production is helpful in focusing most sharply on the policy trade-offs arising specifi cally from vertical interactions between downstream and upstream fi rms. dispersion, against some price dispersion in the Home markets for domestic goods.
We observe here that optimal Foreign monetary policy would mimick Home monetary policy in response to Home shocks, for essentially the same reason. For a given Foreign monetary policy, a Home currency depreciation generates price variability in local currency of Foreign imports from Home, as Home exporters updating their price will lower them. An expansion allows the Foreign monetary authorities to contain import price variability, at the cost of some price dispersion in the domestic market for domestic goods. This is exactly what underlies our numerical results in table 6.1.
As is well understood in the literature, with LCP endogenous changes in monetary stance across countries tend to be positively correlated. In the limiting case in which there is no home bias in consumption (the case reported in the third column in table 6.1), domestic and foreign goods in the Home and the Foreign consumer price indexes have exactly the same weights. This implies that, in response to disturbances to upstream productivity, national monetary policy stances react to the same weighted average of shocks, becoming perfectly correlated in the optimum. As a result, the nominal exchange rate does not respond to shocks (in the third column of table 6.1, the volatility of the real exchange rate is 0), even if shocks are country-specifi c and uncorrelated-a fi nding discussed at length by the literature surveyed in section 6.2. What induces optimal exchange rate variability under cooperation is home bias in consumption, which obviously raises the importance of stabilizing the marginal costs of domestic producers relative to those of the importers (the case shown in the second column in table 6.1). In this respect, our results generalize the point discussed by Corsetti (2006) to an environment with staggered price adjustment. By comparing the fi rst and the second column of table 6.1, it is apparent that the positive comovements in optimal national monetary policies induced by LCP distortions curb the volatility of the terms of trade, relative to the case of fl exible prices. With LCP, nominal exchange rate movements do not help correct international relative prices. The only way in which a nominal expansion cum exchange rate depreciation can reduce the price of domestic goods sold abroad is via price adjustment in foreign currency, but by the Calvo mechanism only a subset of fi rms can reduce their prices. For all the other fi rms, the terms of trade actually move in the direction of an appreciation. Hence, any "expenditure-switching effect" from a monetary expansion has nothing to do with exchange rate movements, and comes at the cost of import price dispersion (which is then the main concern of national monetary authorities). This is why, depending on the relative weight of domestic and imported goods in the CPI, optimal stabilization policy tends to contain international relative prices and thus terms of trade variability.
However, observe that in our results the volatility of the real exchange rate, like that of consumption and hours worked, is higher with nominal rigidities (under the optimal policy), than with fl exible prices-the opposite of our results on the terms of trade. We will return on this important point in the following.
Downstream Shocks Only
Shocks hitting fi nal good producers substantially modify the monetary policy problem in at least two respects. First, in our baseline specifi cation without labor input in downstream production, monetary authorities would never be able to achieve complete stability of fi nal prices, not even in a closed economy environment. In other words, these shocks create policy tradeoffs among competing objectives, independent of openness. The problem is that complete price stability at consumer level requires monetary policy to respond to technology shocks downstream. Because the resulting fl uctuations in wages (see section 6.6.2) induce (inefficient) price dispersion among upstream fi rms, it follows that fi nal producers will face different costs of their intermediate input, depending on which industry they operate in. In this sense, vertical interactions in our model bring about an important dimension of heterogeneity across fi rms, which should be appropriately emphasized. Differently from standard sticky price models, the marginal costs of our downstream fi rms are generally not symmetric, not even when the economy is completely closed to foreign trade, and there are no markup shocks; due, for example, to stochastic preferences.
Second, since fi nal producers differentiate locally the products they bring to consumers, downstream shocks add an important element of nontradability to consumer goods. Hence, even when consumer expenditure is not biased toward domestic goods, consumption baskets would still be effectively different across countries. When the expenditure weights a H and a F are identical-a case of no home bias in terms of upstream products-monetary authorities would efficiently provide the same degree of stabilization across all categories of domestic and imported goods. Yet in contrast to the case of upstream disturbances only, the optimal monetary stance will be sufficiently different across countries as to induce nominal and real exchange rate fl uctuations in response to country-specifi c shocks at downstream level. This result is a generalization of Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) , who also stress nontradability as a reason for nominal exchange rate fl exibility. However, they include nontradables as a separate sector in the economy (as they abstract from vertical interactions), and focus on the case of one period preset prices (hence abstract from forward-looking price setting).
The previous discussion is clearly refl ected in the results in table 6.2. When we focus on downstream shocks only, the variability of CPI infl ation is not zero, and remains remarkably stable for different degrees of home bias in consumption. What instead varies considerably with the degree of home bias is the variability of markups across sectors, since home bias shifts the weight of monetary stabilization away from imported goods. Precisely, observe that in the third column-the case of no home bias-markups are equally stabilized at the retail level, for both domestic and foreign goods. In the second column, instead, the markup of fi nal producers is much less volatile if they sell domestic goods than if they sell imported goods.
Relative to the case of upstream shocks, there are two notable differences regarding exchange rate volatility. First, because of nontradability, the real exchange rate is now much more volatile than the terms of trade, even in the fl exible price allocation. Second, relative to the fl exible price allocation, an economy with nominal rigidities and the optimal policy in place will be characterized by more volatility in both the real exchange rate and the terms of trade. The fact that these patterns are quite different from those discussed in the previous subsection makes it clear that optimal monetary policies do not translate into any general prescription about the relative volatility of these international prices.
Baseline Economy
We now have all the basic elements to analyze our baseline economy with all shocks combined. Results are shown in table 6.3. Observe that the combination of downstream and upstream shocks raises the volatility in our artifi cial economy reasonably close to the data for the United States and other large industrial economies: for instance, the standard deviations of real GDP is (realistically) around 2 percent, regardless of nominal rigidities.
Consider fi rst the fl exible-price benchmark, shown in the fi rst column of the table. With fl exible prices, the demand elasticity facing producers, and thus the markups they charge, are constant; therefore the law of one price holds at the dock (the volatility of deviations from the law of one price at the dock is correspondingly zero). Nonetheless, the law of one price cannot (and does not) hold for fi nal goods: country-specifi c productivity shocks hitting the downstream fi rms drive a wedge between fi nal goods' prices across countries (expressed in a common currency). As a result, and in accord to stylized facts, the real exchange rate is more volatile than the terms of trade; the correlation between the real (and nominal) exchange rate is high and positive-despite the fact that upstream and downstream technology shocks are assumed not to be correlated. Recall that, in our fl exible-price economy, we posit that monetary policy keeps the CPI constant: consistent with this monetary regime, sectoral infl ation rates are more volatile at producer level than at the fi nal level, and for imported goods than for domestically produced goods, respectively. The latter result clearly refl ects the low weight of foreign goods in the CPI. The second column of table 6.3 displays results for our sticky-price economy with the optimal policy in place. In order to reduce inefficiencies due to price stickiness, monetary policy mitigates fl uctuations in the major components of consumer price infl ation. However, it falls short of completely stabilizing either the CPI or domestic intermediate prices infl ation. Key to understanding this result are the different trade-offs discussed in our text. First, as in Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) , LCP at upstream level leads benevolent monetary authorities to attach a positive weight to stabilizing the consumer price of imports, and thus to deviate from perfect stabilization of the fi nal prices of domestic goods. Second, downstream technology The implications of these trade-offs for the volatilities of prices and markups, real exchange rates, and terms of trade are discussed following, together with a comparative analysis of the optimal policy relative to other policy rules.
Prices and Markups
Because of limited price adjustment, it is not surprising that real variables generally display more volatility in the sticky-price economy (with the optimal monetary policy in place), than in the fl exible-price economy. 18 Notable exceptions are the terms of trade and hours worked. The reduced volatility of the terms of trade is a consequence of LCP at the intermediate level, as discussed in section 6.7.1. A reduced volatility of hours worked is already a feature of optimal monetary policy with downstream shocks only in table 6.2, and is essentially a consequence of our assumption that downstream fi rms do not employ labor.
What is most interesting, instead, is the very large discrepancy in volatilities of producers' and distributors' average markups, which are constant in the fl exible-price allocation. The markup of domestically produced goods is two-and-a-half times as volatile at the upstream level as at the downstream level. This is remarkable in light of the fact that, in our experiments, we assume the same degree of nominal rigidities at either level. The volatility differential refl ects the real components of markup movements in producers' prices, arising from vertical interactions. Conversely, the markup of imported goods is more volatile at the downstream level than at the upstream level-almost twice as much. Such differential refl ects the fact that optimal policy attaches a large weight to stabilizing domestically produced goods at the retail level-the bulk of households' consumption.
We should stress here that fl uctuations in markups translate into inefficient deviations in the law of one price, both at the border and at the consumer level. Observe that the volatility of deviations from the law of one price in fi nal prices is quite similar to the one in the economy with fl exible prices, 18. The volatility differential between our economies with and without nominal rigidities is by no means uniform across sectors. Namely, for domestically produced goods, the ratio in volatility of upstream and downstream prices is 4 in the fl exible price allocation, but it falls down to 2.5 with nominal rigidities. A similar drop can be found in the ratio of volatility of imports prices to domestic goods prices. Conversely, the volatility of the producer price of imported goods, though lower than in the fl exible price economy, is now twice that of domestically produced goods. notwithstanding that, per effect of the exchange rate movements, the markups of Home downstream fi rms selling imported goods have the highest volatility.
Real Exchange Rates and Terms of Trade
A notable international dimension of the optimal policy in table 6.3 is that the real exchange rate is more volatile in the economy with nominal frictions than under fl exible prices, while the terms of trade are less volatile, refl ecting the effects of LCP and nontradability previously discussed. These fi ndings clearly caution against suggestions to drastically curb the volatility of nominal and real exchange rates. For instance, they caution against the strong policy prescription derived by Devereux and Engel (2007) , who argue that under pervasive LCP the optimal stabilization policy should reduce the variability of the real exchange rate signifi cantly below that of the terms of trade. In these authors' view, the fact that we observe the opposite pattern in the data suggests that policymakers around the world fail to stabilize currency movements efficiently. As we argued previously, the problem with this and similar views is that, while there are good theoretical reasons to expect optimal policies under LCP to contain the volatility of the terms of trade, these reasons cannot be mechanically applied to the real exchange rate, whose volatility is bound to depend on a number of structural features of the economy. 19
Simple Rules
The last three columns of table 6.3 report results for alternative policy rules; namely, CPI infl ation targeting, GDP infl ation targeting, and a standard Taylor rule. Compared to the optimal policy, these alternative simple rules bring about noticeably larger volatility in most real variables, particularly in the markups and the deviations from the law of one price for both consumer prices and prices at the dock.
Focus fi rst on the strict CPI infl ation targeting regime, presented in the third column of table 6.3: such monetary policy regime leads to more volatility in the upstream prices of all goods (imported and domestically produced). Relative to the optimal policy, the economy displays higher volatility of markups, terms of trade, and the real exchange rate. This is so because complete stabilization of headline consumer price infl ation brings about suboptimally large movements in sectoral (i.e., domestic and imported goods) infl ation rates at retail level, which ultimately affect the desired markups by upstream producers. 19 . As discussed previously, in our model the optimal ranking of volatility between the real exchange rate and the terms of trade depends, among other things, on the relative degree of price stickiness among upstream and downstream producers. If producer prices are assumed to be completely fl exible, the real exchange rate becomes less volatile than the terms of trade-in line with the case discussed by Devereux and Engel (2007) .
Likewise, stabilizing the prices of domestically produced goods-the case dubbed GDP infl ation targeting in the fourth column of table 6.3-also leads to too much volatility in sectoral infl ation rates, especially in infl ation of imported goods at the border as well as at the consumer level. Interestingly, consumption and real GDP are less volatile than under the optimal policy, but this is achieved by generating more volatility in all other real variables, especially in hours worked and in the terms of trade, because of the suboptimally low weight attached to stabilizing export and import goods prices.
Finally, a Taylor rule (following a quite standard parameterization) improves on the strict CPI infl ation target by producing less volatility in consumption and hours. However, relative to the optimal policy, both the CPI and its individual components are too volatile, since too much importance is attached to output stabilization. As a result, the volatility of consumption is excessive, and that of hours is too low.
Concluding Remarks
The literature in international economics and open macro has so far pursued two distinct explanations of the observed stability of import prices in local currency. According to one modeling strategy, this is the result of optimal markup adjustment by monopolistic fi rms, which optimize profi ts through price discrimination across national markets. In this case, market segmentation is attributed to real factors. According to an alternative modeling strategy, local currency price stability refl ects nominal rigidities, which imply suboptimal variations in fi rms' profi ts in response to shocks. By considering vertically integrated fi rms, our chapter emphasizes that a rigid distinction between these two approaches is unwarranted, since optimal markup adjustments and nominal frictions are likely to act as intertwined factors in causing stable import prices in local currency. Specifi cally, we build a model where, because of market-specifi c nominal rigidities at the downstream level, different dynamics in fi nal prices provide an incentive for upstream producers to price discriminate across countries, exacerbating the distortions from monopoly power. At the same time, the use of local nontradable inputs by fi rms selling goods to fi nal users mutes the response of fi nal prices to exchange rate movements.
There are at least three potentially important implications of our fi ndings for policymaking. First, by creating price discrimination at the border, consumer price movements feed back to deviations from the law of one price across markets. The transmission mechanism from consumer price infl ation to price discrimination provides monetary authorities with an additional reason to stabilize fi nal prices. In this respect, our analysis sheds light on one possible reason why the progressive stabilization of infl ation in the last decade may have contributed to the observed fall in exchange rate passthrough. By reducing movements in consumer prices, policymakers indirectly affect the demand elasticity faced by upstream producers, reducing opportunities for exercising monopoly power through price discrimination.
Yet complete CPI stabilization will never be desirable in our economies, because of both international and domestic policy trade-offs. Specifi cally, in addition to the international dimensions of monetary policy already discussed in the literature, we show that, with vertical interactions among industries adjusting prices in a staggered fashion, domestic price stability is actually unfeasible. This is due to the fact that nominal rigidities inducing staggered pricing by upstream producers inherently lead to cost heterogeneity among downstream fi rms.
Finally, as shown by the literature, nominal rigidities in local currency induce positive comovements in the optimal monetary stance across countries, which tend to curb the volatility of the terms of trade. However, our results make it clear that, at an optimum, the real exchange rate can be more or less volatile than the terms of trade, depending on a number of structural features of the economy, like home bias in expenditure and local components of marginal costs in consumer goods. In this sense, the empirical regularity that real exchange rates are typically more volatile than the terms of trade does not automatically suggest that policymakers fall short of stabilizing exchange rates efficiently.
Appendix
In this appendix we provide details on the derivation of a few results used extensively in the text.
Price Dispersions
We can write the within-industry price dispersion of consumer prices as:
Similarly, we can express the across-industry dispersion in consumer prices as follows: 
The Derivative of the Optimal Downstream Price with Respect to Upstream Prices
We now show that ∂P Noting that ∂MC tϩk (h)/ ∂P ෆ t (h) ϭ 1/ Z tϩk ϭ MC tϩk (h)/ P ෆ t (h), and
we obtain ∂ ∂ = − 1 = + + which after further simplifi cation becomes
